The Gap between Humans and Humanity
Various thinkers -Vico and Malthus, Hegel and Marx, Oswald Spengler and Pitirim Sorokin -have attempted to formulate what might be called "the basic law" of human history and development. Given that these formulas are famous, there is not much sense rehearsing them; given that they are speculative, there is no sense pronouncing judgment on them. I would like instead to propose a basic law myself: individuals fail to keep pace with the evolution of our species. This "law" does not pretend to universality, and I offer it only to help explain some contradictions and paradoxes of our own time. What I mean is that the development of individual human beings is limited by their biological ages -we each die in an underdeveloped state -whereas the social and technological development of humanity as a whole has no limitations of time. The increasing age of Homo sapiens as a species does not result in anything like a commensurate increase in the life span of individuals. With each new generation, therefore, individuals have to cope with an increasingly heavy load of knowledge and experience that their ancestors have accumulated.
The problem of alienation, raised by Marx and others in the nineteenth century, is evidence of this disproportion, as is the failing belief in reality -in reality per se -that characterized the last years of the twentieth. The chronological progression from Marxism to existentialism to poststructuralism, despite wide differences among the three, makes clear how the gap between species and individual has widened. Marxism had not yet relinquished the idea of reality and even made of it a foundation for the critique of social constructs and superstructures. The primary reality for Marxism is the labor of human beings and the resources of human consciousness that have developed and accumulated during our struggle for mastery over nature. This common possession of humanity, despite the current perversity of private ownership, can be reappropriated eventually through social revolution. By the early and mid-twentieth century, existentialists regarded alienation as inherently human and thus irresolvable by any kind of reform or revolution. Individuals are doomed to solitude; they lose their authenticity in society, which imposes unsuitable roles upon them. Whereas Marxism still tried to bridge individual and species, existentialism found the abyss between them impassable. Finally, in this breathless survey: poststructuralism, in the late twentieth century, obviated the problem of alienation by dismissing the very idea of reality: there is nothing to be alienated from. Reality is not temporarily alienated from us (as Marxists argue) or eternally alien (as existentialists say); reality is regarded as delusional, fabricated, or infinitely deferred. In poststructuralism, the idea of humanity as a coherent species is rejected, supplanted by an array of social and cultural constructs, local and partial world pictures. The words mankind, humankind, and humanity appear rarely in poststructuralist texts
without scare quotes, question marks, or cancellations. Each race, gender, age, place, culture, and individual creates its own "reality."
Placing "humanity" and "reality" in scare quotes, however, was perhaps no more than a pathetic revenge: individuals grumbling about a civilization that needs them less and less. The "alienation" of reality from the individual and its subsequent "disappearance" are two steps in the process by which "reality" -the sum total of information that humanity has accumulated -becomes increasingly inaccessible to individuals. The development of information and of information technology has accelerated exponentially. The statistics are overwhelming. In the past thirty years, more new information was produced than in the previous five thousand. A single daily edition of the New York Times contains more information than an average person in the seventeenth century encountered in a lifetime. The world's largest libraries double their resources every fourteen years -in other words, they grow about 130 times larger in the course of each century. 1 (In the early thirteenth century, the library of the Sorbonne was considered the largest in Europe: it contained 1,338 volumes.) According to recent calculations cited in the Encyclopedia Britannica, the number of books published in Europe in the sixteenth century doubled every seven years. Thus, by the year 1600, only a century and a half after Gutenberg's first printing press was in operation, about 35,000 books had been printed, with the total number of copies estimated at 20,000,000. Other calculations show that, in the twentieth century, the global volume of literature in science and technology grew at about this same speed, doubling every seven or eight years. 2 Since 1970, with the growth of computer technologies, the number of bits of information shipped has doubled every 1.1 years. 3 Meanwhile, the average life expectancy in the last four hundred years grew not geometrically but only arithmetically, no more than twice. 4 Hence our decreasing ability to adjust to the informational environment. We are handicapped in the face of excessive data.
1. I have developed these figures with reference to statistics found in Richard Saul Wurman, Information Anxiety (New York: Doubleday, 1989), 6, 35, 206 . The very concept of information anxiety as introduced by Wurman suggests the disproportion between our need for information and our capacity to absorb it: "Information anxiety is produced by the ever-widening gap between what we understand and what we think we should understand. Information anxiety is the black hole between data and knowledge. It happens when information doesn't tell us what we want or need to know" (34). (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 1984 Online, s.v. "Life Span," search .eb.com/eb/article?eu=119862 (accessed September 12, 2003) . Another resource for the individual to cope with the new pressures is economy on sleep time. The National Sleep Foundation estimates that average sleep time dropped 20 percent over the course of the twentieth century, but that drop is only a small fraction of the needed increase. See James Gleick, Faster: The Acceleration of Just About Everything (New York: Pantheon, 1999) , 122. In other words, postmodern culture presents symptoms we might expect of one who has undergone an acutely traumatic experience. Though we mostly assume that superficiality precludes tragedy, in this case a tragic or traumatic experience may have induced our low sensitivity to meanings. The theory of trauma is among the most dynamic divisions of cultural studies and psychology currently. Among its consensual conclusions is that trauma has two distinct features. First, trauma is brought on by experiences so difficult and painful that one is unable to assimilate (and therefore must repress) them. Second, the effect of trauma is delayed and unfolds in a sequence of reactions not directly connected with its source. These reactions are often inadequate, absurd, monotonous repetitions that appear meaningless but reenact a repressed memory. In the words of Michael Herr: "it took the war to teach it, that you were as responsible for everything you saw as you were for everything you did. The problem was that you didn't always know what you were seeing until later, maybe years later, that a lot of it never made it in at all, it just stayed stored there in your eyes." 5 A striking example of how postmodern sensibility has developed in response to cultural trauma is Russian conceptualism, which from the 1970s to the 1990s was occupied with clichés of totalitarian ideology. The Soviet state incessantly bombarded citizens with stereotypes that traumatized the consciousness of several generations. These surfaced in the poetry and visual art of Russian postmodernism, which was insistently mechanical, distant, and insensitive. A "concept" (Russian kontsept) is a unit of conceptual art, a cliché, or a scheme intended to demonstrate its own semantic and affective emptiness. "Proud Muscovites," "a humanistic militiaman," "the evil and stupid Reagan" are concepts appearing regularly in the works of artists like Ilya Kabakov and Eric Bulatov and poets like Dmitry Prigov, Lev Rubinshtein, and Timur Kibirov, the most popular conceptualists of the late Soviet and post-Soviet period. A traumatized consciousness works with surface images as they are impressed on the retina or the eardrum, without affecting the mind and heart. Even the mind and heart themselves are represented in conceptualist art as signs constructed out of, or modeled on, statements like "the party is the mind, the honor, and the conscience of our epoch." It is noteworthy that conceptualism appeared not during the decades of the most aggressive ideological pressure on the public mind (the 1920s through 1950s) but only later, when Soviet ideology was no longer taken literally and seriously.
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Postmodern Symptoms
A delayed rehearsal of images and concepts accumulated through the eye and ear (but repelled by the membrane of consciousness) is typical of trauma. When ideology is perceived as a truthful reflection of reality, its semiotic construction is concealed; however, as perception comes to be split off from attention, understanding, and trust, the "constructedness" of that reality becomes traumatically obvious. The senses are overwhelmed with signs and images, but the intellect no longer admits and processes them.
A similarly traumatic situation has emerged in Western culture under the impact of the mass media, whose increasing assault on the senses has numbed the sensitivity of at least two generations. Television alone, with its hundreds of channels, can be paralyzing: excessive diversity (in the West) has been as traumatizing as repetition and monotony (in the East). By the turn of the 1960s, in East and West alike, information trauma of one kind or the other had already helped occasion the postmodernist mentality. Screens, monitors, texts, graphs, and images multiply, inundate, and influence, but there is nothing behind them.
The postmodern mentality (for present purposes) may be defined as one that processes sense data on the level of signifiers, that level being the only one with which it still can cope.
Postmodern images are residual traces of the pressure exerted on our senses by ideology and the media. Postmodern art disseminates signifiers without apologetic or critical charge, with zero degree of depth and involvement though with overpowering variety. Even the theoretical concepts of poststructuralism, such as trace or différance in Derrida's writing, evidence trauma. The trace differs from the sign in that the former is not representational and has no connection to the signified, which is always deferred, postponed, and never manifested "as real."
Différance as deferral is typical of traumatic response, which blocks every access to the original stimulus. Trauma itself is a trace of the original, while the original is regarded as lost or, rather, as never existent. In sum, the trace is understood as nonreferential -as related to other signs (rather than to any signified). Following this logic of deconstruction (responding, for example, to a red street light as a trace on a par with yellow and green and ignoring the actual traffic) can be fatal.
One reason why America, otherwise so pragmatic a culture, has so eagerly adapted postmodern theory is that the information explosion has occurred on a larger scale in the United States than elsewhere. Average Americans, who spend one-third of their lives in front of a television and/or computer screen, are unlikely to regard "the flickering of signifiers" as an alarming way to characterize reality. Sophisticated poststructuralist terms -"the chain of signifiers," "the play E p s t e in • B e t w e e n H u m a n i t y a n d H u m a n B e in g s 23 of signifiers," "simulacra," "hyperreality" -reflect a mentality that, traumatized by an excess of information, no longer believes in the axis "signifier-signified" and has lost both the intuition of depth and the will for transcendence.
Postmodernism is often said to be oblivious of tragedy -to be euphoric, playful, permissive. But euphoria can be the consequence of a trauma that retains all its pain unconsciously. Trauma is healed anesthetically: since the pain does not subside, the sensitivity to it is numbed. With one's nerve endings, as it were, paralyzed, one effect of trauma is to impede penetration into regions where meaning is identified with pain. Instead the traumatized consciousness glides easily over the surface of things and gives into the bliss of thoughtlessness. In this condition, one is stimulated and intoxicated by diversity for its own sake, a feast of unending differences. Such "happiness," as Lev Rubinshtein puts it (in On and On), is expressed in "a strangulated voice."
Negative Reference
Jean Baudrillard, among other theoreticians, holds that the postmodern mentality has abandoned reality and all referential connection with it. But reference does still occur -though negatively. The nerves in a human hand are capable of feeling an object and transmitting an adequate impression of it. If a hand has been frostbitten and has lost its sensitivity, it will fail to feel the object, yet the referential connection will not be lost. A frostbitten hand is evidence that frost is real -that the aspect of reality that caused the trauma (to the hand) is real. As Cathy Caruth makes this point: "The attempt to gain access to a traumatic history . . . is also the project of listening beyond the pathology of individual suffering, to the reality of a history that in its crises can only be perceived in unassimilable forms." 6 While trauma in one sense interrupts the referential process and renders further experience of reality distorted or even impossible, trauma does permit negative reference: reality can be indicated through a failure to register it.
Various physical handicaps (blindness and deafness, notably) may prevent a person from developing an undistorted image of the world, but a body may still bear witness to the accident that has incapacitated it. Burned skin may not feel heat and blinded eyes do not see light, but burned skin and blinded eyes convey adequately the reality of an explosion. Indeed, insensibility may reflect more truthfully than any representation could an event "behind" the interruption of the senses. Would not loss of vision be more adequate evidence of a nuclear attack than a meticulous observation of the bombing would be? Speaking at the opening of a Holocaust archive, Geoffrey Hartman said -on behalf of the victims: "My mind forgets, but my body keeps the score. The body is bleeding history." 7 Trauma theory can stimulate insights into the theory of cognition and the genesis of culture. Kant is famous for his agnostic postulate that we cannot perceive reality as it is ("things-in-themselves"). In that sense, we are all epistemologically handicapped and perhaps traumatized. Could it be that things-inthemselves have a shell-shocking quality that incapacitates cognition? We cannot preclude that culture resulted from a prehistorical trauma that split reality into things-for-us (signifiers) and -hidden from our senses -things-in-themselves (signifieds). Signifiers may be scars preventing us from immediate perception of their signifieds yet referring us to something absent from the here and now. If we can access reality only through signs, it may be that they are marks of insensitivity inflicted long ago upon our senses.
From this point of view, postmodernism signals the emergence of mature self-awareness on the part of a handicapped culture. Only with the acceptance that our knowledge is constructed and insurmountably semiotic have we come to terms with the limitations of our condition -which helps explain why cripples, prostheses, organs without bodies, and bodies without organs are so prevalent in postmodern discourse. "We must, in short, consider our limbs, hands, toes, breasts . . . in themselves, severed from the organic unity of the body . . . we must, in other words, disarticulate, mutilate the body" is a sampling of that discourse (from Paul de Man). 8 Our handicapped culture requires, more and more, that we rely on prostheses -external devices and technological enhancements -in order to integrate us as individuals into its grand informational systems. Between my hand, which presses a key on a computer keyboard, and my eyes, which look at the monitor, there are dozens of hardware and software mediators, wires, gigabites of electronic memory, and multitudes of microprocessors. The body itself serves as a more or less effective natural surrogate for more perfect wires and microprocessors; the body has become a prosthesis for prostheses. In the fragmentary, aggregate body of postmodern theory, all our parts can be disassembled, enhanced with prostheses, and reassembled in a different order. Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, in Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, propose that the dismembered body is a revolutionary challenge to late capitalist civilization.
But our state of affairs is more likely just the opposite: the information culture dismembers us, separating eyes from hands, ears from legs, consciousness from the body. A human being is not the head and brains of the information culture 7. Geoffrey Hartman's talk was delivered at Emory University in 1996. E p s t e in • B e t w e e n H u m a n i t y a n d H u m a n B e in g s 25 but rather its beheaded victim. A genuine challenge to that culture would be an attempt to reassemble a human being that it has disassembled and disabled.
To assess the pan-human informational resources required to bridge the gap between humanity and individual humans, we might reassess the Nietzschean idea of an Übermensch. For this Superman is an individual actually commensurable with the species. But a Nietzschean Superman would be universal and unified in ways that would impede the future -specialized and prosthetized -that postmodernism predicts and prefers. Every move toward integration and wholeness meets with strong opposition among postmodern intellectuals who view such tendencies as potentially threatening us with ideological intolerance and, ultimately, totalitarianism. However, as the Latin saying divide et impera may remind us, power belongs to the one who divides, not the one who unites.
Specialization and Disintegration
One can imagine a time when only exceptional individuals -superhumans equipped with supercomputers -can keep up in the information age. Sooner or later, even they will fall behind and civilization will rush ahead, uncontrollably and at last incomprehensibly. One way to lessen the gap is to compress the material that needs learning: by this means the volume of information accumulated by humankind can be absorbed within an individual life span. Voltaire noted the already growing significance of anthologies, digests of excerpts, and encyclopedias as summaries of knowledge that previous generations had received in extensive and raw form. Today, fewer and fewer people read the classics (even classics of the nineteenth and eighteenth centuries, such as Voltaire): we learn about their work mainly from screen versions or from articles and occasionally lectures. The reading list of modern classics now includes Proust, Woolf, and Nabokov, whereas the canon of moderns for our great-grandparents would have extended from Voltaire and Austen to no one later than Tolstoy. But our life span has not increased sufficiently to compensate for the expanded reading list. If we could miraculously increase the average life span to a thousand years, we could leisurely read Tolstoy and Homer in the originals, and university courses could dedicate ten years to the study of antiquity alone. As matters stand, however, criticism and theory will increasingly predominate over literature -secondary languages and metadiscourses over primary sources -in postmodern education even of the most elite varieties.
To service the intensifying need for compression, high technologies have been developed for the storage and transmission of information. The process of retrieving information is being sped up by committing libraries throughout the world to thin compact disks. Because this process complicates and compresses simultaneously, it might be termed "involution" (as opposed to, but parallel with, evolution). Anything that humanity develops historically, we at the same time condense symbolically. In 1937, inspired by the "involutionary" potential of microfilm, H. G. Wells wrote optimistically that there is no practical obstacle whatever now to the creation of an efficient index to all human knowledge, ideas and achievement, to the creation, that is, of a complete planetary memory for all mankind. And not simply an index. . . . It foreshadows a real intellectual unification of our race. The whole human memory can be, and probably in a short time will be, made accessible to every individual. 9 Yet even involutionary technologies and techniques are themselves subject to evolutionary proliferation. Criticism, for instance, condenses literary material, but the material of criticism itself increases incessantly; even the critical literature is by now impossible to keep up with, let alone master. Metalanguages proliferate, and new languages on the next discursive levels build upon them. A growing number of critical works deal not with primary literature at all but with secondary and tertiary sources (there is criticism of criticism of criticism . . . ).
Involution still lags behind evolution, and the result is the further fragmentation of culture and the specialization of subcultures. Individuals identify less and less with humanity at large and more and more with a local culture or a narrow discipline. By the end of the twentieth century, the problem of multiculturalism had become central to both intellectual and political discourse: a variety of subcultures had come to claim the status of fully developed and self-sufficient cultures requiring no bond with universal culture or any comprehensive idea of humanity. The ideas of humanity and universality had become as ridiculous among postmodern intellectuals as they used to be in Marxist party cells at the turn of the twentieth century. According to this divisionary logic, there are men and women, "hetero" and "homo," white and black, people with income above and below, dwellers in large and small cities . . . whereas "human being" is a harmful myth or a naive abstraction promoted by utopians and totalitarians. In much the same way, all forms of human knowledge and activity are becoming increasingly particularized. It is still possible to be a specialist in Leibniz or Hegel today; one needs simply to read a few hundred books by and about them. In a century or two, even such narrow specialization will be considered inadmissibly broad. There will be specialists on one theme or one work of Leibniz or Hegel.
But the main result of the disproportion between pan-human culture and its individual reception may eventually be information trauma so extreme as to Renaissance kind, went so far as to speculate that information trauma could result in human extinction. As Fuller wrote in the introduction to his magnum opus
Synergetics:
Advancing science has now discovered that all the known cases of biological extinction have been caused by overspecialization, whose concentration of only selected genes sacrifices general adaptivity. . . . In the meantime, humanity has been deprived of comprehensive understanding. Specialization has bred feelings of isolation, futility, and confusion in individuals. It also resulted in the individual's leaving responsibility for thinking and social action to others. Specialization breeds biases that ultimately aggregate as international and ideological discord, which, in turn, leads to war. . . . Only a comprehensive switch from the narrowing specialization and toward an ever more inclusive and refining comprehension by all humanity -regarding all the factors governing omnicontinuing life aboard our spaceship Earth -can bring about reorientation from the self-extinction-bound human trending, and do so within the critical time remaining before we have passed the point of chemical process irretrievability. 10
A Century of New Catastrophes?
The dangers of the information explosion are no less significant than those Malthus associated with the demographic one. Malthus pointed up the disproportion between the biological and economic productivity of humankind, and he indicated the threats involved; still, humanity as a whole has a better chance of competing with itself successfully than an individual human being has in competing with humankind. It is clear that the main resources of common wealth are now informational rather than industrial or agricultural. Paradoxically, in the sphere of material production, consumption is much easier and faster than manufacturing, whereas in the realm of information the situation is reversed.
The consumption of information by individuals is drastically behind the production of information by humanity. With concerted effort, humanity can feed itself; but can it understand itself, however great the effort it expends? Can an individual mind ever encompass what the mind of the species creates? Given the predictability of failure, individuals will continue to diversify and specialize: they will narrow their scope until the words humans and humanity have almost nothing in common. (New York: Macmillan, 1975) , xxv, xxvii.
Richard Buckminster Fuller, Synergetics: Explorations in the Geometry of Thinking
Among the first to see this kind of diversity as disintegration was the German philosopher Wilhelm Windelband (1848 -1915):
Culture has grown too much for an individual to view it as a whole. This impossibility harbors a great social danger. . . . The awareness of universal connectedness that should dominate the whole of cultural life is gradually lost, and society is threatened by the danger of falling apart into groups and atoms, linked by external need and necessity rather than by spiritual understanding. . . . Unable to penetrate into the depths, the specifics, and the contents of other areas of knowledge, a contemporary man is satisfied by superficial dilettantism, skimming the cream from everything without touching the essence. 11
Given our current taste for surfaces and diversity, we naturally dismiss this warning, written in 1878, about a "great social danger" impending. If more than a century and a quarter have passed without incident, surely we are safe. But then, we think again: passed without incident? Were not the world wars and revolutions of the last century consequences of the conditions that Windelband described? Is it accidental that a nation that had, for many years, led in the progress of humanity also initiated both world wars? As Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno said of the nazification of Germany, "the progress toward the new order has been carried out largely by people whose consciousness progress has left behind -bankrupts, sectarians, fools." 12 The "dialectics of Enlightenment" had turned those in Germany who could not keep up with it toward a violent simplification.
One can only speculate what sorts of catastrophe may yet ensue as epiphenomena of the information explosion. It is easy for Internet smart alecks to unite in contempt for the handicapped -for those who cannot handle traffic on the information highway. But Horkheimer and Adorno's caution to smart alecks is still apt:
One of the lessons of the Hitler period is the stupidity of cleverness. . . . Clever people have always made things easy for barbarians, because they are so stupid. It is the well-informed, farsighted judgments, the prognoses based on statistics and experience, the observations that begin: "I happen to be an expert in this field," it is the well-founded, conclusive statements which are untrue. Hitler was against intellect and humanity. But there is also an intellect which is against humanity: it is distinguished by well informed superiority. E p s t e in • B e t w e e n H u m a n i t y a n d H u m a n B e in g s
29
Among the idiots of progress are some who are formidably intelligent and cunning. The leaders of those left behind on the curb, the professional idiots of progress, are not infrequently geniuses and, on behalf of the idiots they lead, can make quick work of any smart aleck. "Those who came to power in Germany were smarter than liberals and more stupid" -this insight of Horkheimer and Adorno's about stupidity and intelligence in Nazi Germany is applicable to Bolshevik Russia as well. 14 The Hitlers, Lenins, and Stalins may fail to understand the dialectics and the products of Enlightenment, but the intelligence of such people is adequate to the task of lining up all who are enlightened for execution. Now that the main types of wealth and capital are less material than informational, we can expect revolutionary unrest among those who are informationally deprived. Informational impoverishment may prove to be even more explosive than material poverty. The revolutions of the twentieth century may come to look like street pranks in comparison with those of the twenty-first.
Societal disproportions, if ignored, will sooner or later find cataclysmic outlets: the experience of the twentieth century supports this conclusion. Such cataclysms are followed by periods of sobering up, during which peaceful resolutions are sought. The brown plague and the red have run their course in this way, after taking millions of lives. Slowly, the demographic crisis is also being resolved, though not without its own victims -millions of starving and starved.
The most pronounced disproportion of all is now upon us and should be treated as seriously as possible, as immediately as possible. The overwhelming majority of us are becoming more and more idiotic in relation to the species' accumulated knowledge. In the nineteenth century the materially dispossessed were termed proletarians. The growing new class of dispossessed could be called "infoprols."
However counterintuitive it may seem, informational wealth is more difficult to distribute than material wealth. In order to feed five people with one piece of bread, we must divide it into five parts; and each person fed will have insufficient food. In order to transmit one idea to five people, we do not have to divide it; on the contrary, the idea will in a sense multiply by five because it will be assimilated differently by each individual. Informational capital increases easily, and as a rule no deficit occurs when information circulates. Its circulation occasions a new problem, however -that of unconsumable excess. A mind unable to grasp a given idea or to process a quantity of information is a deprived and potentially destructive mind. Incomprehension is a graver predicament than undernourishment: a hungry man can be given bread to eat but an informationally deprived one is like a starving man without a stomach. The deficiency is internal. The lack is not of informational resources to distribute but of the intellectual ability to consume them. Who are these informationally deprived people? In various degrees, every-14. Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic, 174.
one, because as individuals we all lag behind the advancement of our common knowledge, which is both everyone's and no one's. This disproportion, unlike that between rich and poor, in some degree separates everyone from all. Consequently, the wrath of this growing majority can be vented only on itself.
Postscript: Para-Informational Society
There are some who believe that the dangers I am describing are illusory: computers will solve the problem of excess that they contributed so materially to causing. The Internet, after all, permits us to access and sort through a vast amount of data in a relatively brief time -no matter how much information we produce, computers will help us to store, organize, and use it. But by moving to solve one set of problems, the computer has brought on a set of new ones. With the Internet, each consumer of information becomes potentially also a producer; and the last thing we need is more. Further, the information produced in this way tends to be of very inferior quality yet must still be taken into account. In the past, the deficiency of printing materials limited the author's access to publication by imposing professional, editorial, educational, and stylistic criteria. Manuscript culture, over the previous centuries, had created its own rigid criteria of selection; it was mostly holy scriptures and canonical literary works that were copied.
The criteria of print culture have been less rigid but still usefully exclusive. With the spread of digital literacy, all selective criteria for publishing have become obsolete. The sound waves of the Internet are now everywhere but its sounds are mostly noise. Though the production of information is accelerating, the capacities for its transmission are growing even faster, and the widening gap might be termed informational noise. The catastrophe of the information explosion is that many people cannot absorb information that they need, whereas the catastrophe of informational noise is that at least as many people can spread information that is unneeded.
To filter out the noise is a practical impossibility. Since most of us have ten fingers and dozens of keys under them, we are en route to developing a parainformational society in which any meaningful phrase that is uttered drowns quickly in insignificant sound. The result is close to Borges's "Library of Babel," a universal treasury/dumpster that contains everything that ever was, will be, or can be written: "For every rational line or forthright statement there are leagues of senseless cacophony, verbal nonsense, and incoherency. . . . Infidels claim that the rule in the Library is not 'sense', but 'nonsense', and that 'rationality' (even humble, pure coherence) is an almost miraculous exception." 15 Can this develop- Paradoxical as it may seem, it is easier to create something out of nothing than to locate something amid everything. This rule of thumb is equally valid for scientific research, as John Naisbitt, a leading analyst of social megatrends, has observed:
Uncontrolled and unorganized information is no longer a resource in an information society. Instead, it becomes the enemy of the information worker. Scientists who are overwhelmed with technical data complain of information pollution and charge that it takes less time to do an experiment than to find out whether or not it has already been done. 16 No industry can contaminate the natural environment so noxiously as our words can pollute the informational environment. To build an ecologically dirty factory or machine in real space is expensive and time-consuming. Virtual space consumes no more wealth and time than trash. Yet virtual space is also the space of my consciousness and is, for me, limited by the length of my life. The purity of virtual space is even more precious than that of the natural environment. What we take in off the Internet is impressed upon our brains; it occupies our megabytes of personal memory. If the individual lags disastrously behind humanity at large, this is a problem of the "ecology of consciousness" -a question of how to protect mental space. The dregs of verbal entropy grow in geometric progression with the growth of information itself, and both are clogging mental space. The effect is an intellectual numbness that Orrin Klapp described as boredom:
While we tend to think of boredom as arising from a deficit of stimuli (information underload), it also (and, in fact, more commonly) arises from excessive stimulation (information overload). Information, like energy, tends to degrade into entropy -into noise, redundancy, and banality -as the fast horse of information outstrips the slow horse of meaning. 17 In this essay I have not tried to move beyond the limits of alarmist discourse. The foundations of secular alarmism (as opposed to religious alarmism, for instance of the biblical prophets) were laid by Malthus at the end of 
